

**THE INDONESIAN MILITARY RESPONSE
TO REFORM IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
A Comparative Analysis of Three Civilian Regimes
1998-2004**

Poltak Partogi Nainggolan



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Penulis:

Poltak Partogi Nainggolan

Desain Sampul:

Fery C. Syifa

Tata Letak:

Zaki

Diterbitkan oleh:

Pusat Pengkajian, Pengolahan Data dan Informasi (P3DI)
Sekretariat Jenderal DPR Republik Indonesia
Gedung Nusantara I Lt. 2
Jl. Jenderal Gatot Subroto Jakarta Pusat 10270
Telp. (021) 5715409 Fax. (021) 5715245

Bersama:

Azza Grafika, Anggota IKAPI DIY, No. 078/DIY/2012

Kantor Pusat:

Jl. Seturan II CT XX/128 Yogyakarta
Telp. +62 274-6882748

Perwakilan Jabodetabek:

Graha Azza Grafika Perumahan Alam Asri
B-1 No. 14 Serua Bojongsari Kota Depok 16520
Telp. +62 21-49116822

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This dissertation or book is dedicated to
those who struggled for a better Indonesia and became the victims of
reform movements

FOREWORDS

Pursuing higher education in developed countries makes you different in deciding what steps you will take after you finish your final examination. In Indonesia, if you finish your final examination, this means that you have totally finished your study, and there is no need to answer the question, “when will you publish your thesis or dissertation?” Of course, this question is not easy to be quickly answered because you need time to check again thoroughly the all works. Also, to find a good publisher, whom you believe your masterpiece to be worldwide well-published, will take time since this is not only an issue regarding the production cost of the book, but also with the publisher’s experience in disseminating your hardwork.

Different from in the UK and Germany where I have respectively finished my second and third degrees, in Indonesia, you have automatically deserved for a degree once after you finish your final examination. There is always a strong message for students there reminding you that you have not actually accomplished your Master or PhD work if you have not yet published it. In the last few years, I more often heard this message when I met my supervisor, Prof. Juergen Rueland, and foreign friends, in particular, from Germany, US, and Australia, even when the final examination has not been scheduled at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet Freiburg. The last time, I heard the same question from my colleagues from GIGA, ABI, and the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet Freiburg such as Dr. Andreas Ufen, Dr. Paruedee Nguitrageool, and Dr. Stefan Rother.

The main reason they said it is a classical one: they want to have a better understanding by reading the printing version rather than by opening the e-book version published the e-library section. The on-line publication of this PhD thesis has been prepared by the *Universitätsbibliothek* of the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitaet Freiburg, Germany. Without the presence of the printing publication edition, therefore, the doctoral study still likely has been not yet accomplished. For this reason, the printing publication is launched sooner than it has been planned.

The PhD dissertation itself was a reflection of what has been seen and experienced by the author from the field as a researcher who has been working in the Indonesian parliament (DPR) since more than twenty years ago, witnessing the process of regime change from the center of power, namely the parliament, particularly, during the crucial time 1998-2004. We know that there is an issue

of transitional justice which is important for nation which is still in transition. Milan Kundera, in his insights in *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, 1979, has reminded us, that the struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting. He underlined that the first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory, to destroy its books, its culture, and its history. He reminded us also that then the remnants of the old regime try to write new books, to manufacture a new culture, and to invent a new history, and then, before long, the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was. Eventually, the world around it will forget even faster. That is why Kundera mentioned that the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.

The objective of this PhD research dissertation or book is not part of a struggle for power but attempting to clearly reveal and explain what really happened in Indonesia's transition. It is expected therefore that the book can give sufficient explanations to the unclear transition after the crucial years of 1998-2004, which can be contributed to bring back the reform movement into its right track. Thus, for positive reason, it is not wrong to say here that this publication is also part of the struggle of memory against forgetting.

Finally, to all reform activists who have dreamt of and died for the sake of the reform movement and the struggle for a better Indonesia, I dedicated this book. Now, the mission is really accomplished.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Having worked in an institution such as the Indonesian parliament (DPR) -- an important actor in the democratic transition in Indonesia -- and witnessed many important events during this period, I am encouraged to share with the public my knowledge and insights into what really happened. The unclear prospect of post-Soeharto reform and the chaotic situation caused by various conflicts throughout Indonesia have also motivated me to examine the response of the Indonesian military, which since the formation of the country has been viewed as the loyal guardian of the state.

The idea for this dissertation came up in mid-2001, after the sudden fall of the first democratically elected civilian regime of Abdurrahman Wahid. However, the project could only begin in 2004 after I had received a positive response from the representative of the *Hanns Seidel-Stiftung* in Jakarta, Mr. Christian Hegemer, about my PhD scholarship for the study at *Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg* (University of Freiburg). I, therefore, would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the *Hanns Seidel-Stiftung*. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Christian Hegemer, Dr. Michael Czepalla and Mrs. Monika Gerhard for their efforts in providing the scholarship and extending it.

Despite the difficulties to find a supervisor (*Doktorvater*), who is an expert on civil-military relations and Indonesia's democratic transition, I eventually found Prof. Jürgen Rüländ, a well-known scholar on Southeast Asia. However, the next difficulties came: I had to persuade both Prof. Rüländ and my employer, the Research Centre of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), of the feasibility of my project, a process that took several months before I eventually got Prof. Rüländ's final consent.

During this period, I received much encouragement from Dr. Andreas Ufen from the *Institut für Asienstudien* at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Hamburg, Dr. Andreas Ufen, who persuaded me to wait and carry on. Despite his tight schedule, and busy activities at the Department of Political Science (*Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik*), Prof. Rüländ has done much to supervise this dissertation amid many frustrations, including the constraints of the scholarship. He assisted me in applying for the extension of the scholarship and, more significantly, provided his advice that helped me accomplish this dissertation six years afterward. For this reason, my sincere appreciation goes to Prof. Jürgen Rüländ, who has also dedicated his time and tireless support to help me improve the final version of this dissertation.

For the preparation of the proposal and the evaluation of this dissertation, I am extremely grateful to Prof. Heribert Weiland, the Director of *Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut* (ABI) Freiburg. I deeply appreciate the time he devoted to me and the access he provided me to ABI's facilities, especially for office space and the institute's excellent library. I thus also extend my sincere gratitude to the staff and librarians of ABI for their friendly assistance and good service.

During the processes of researching and writing my dissertation, I learnt much from many colleagues and friends at the *Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg* and the *Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut*. I am grateful to those who spent their time and efforts to share with me their views and suggestions during seminars, colloquiums, and meetings of the Southeast Asian Studies group. Others from whom I have greatly benefitted in discussions on issues of democratic transition in Indonesia are Dr. Marcel Baumann, Dr. Stefan Rother, Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, Dr. Maria-Gabriela Manea and Dr. Paruedee Nguitragool. I am very grateful for their interest in my academic work and progress, the mentoring they provided to me (especially for meeting the formalities at the university) and their assistance in finding new accommodation. This gratitude also includes my Indonesian friends from the University of Indonesia, particularly Panji Anugrah Permana, who have just started their own doctoral project.

I also greatly appreciate all the secretarial assistance I received from Mrs. Böhme and Mrs. Trinh since my arrival in Freiburg as a foreign student. I am grateful for their helping hands in handling my communications with the university, particularly the Department of Political Science (*Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik*), and settling administrative and personal problems. For further technical assistance, I would like to thank Yulia Indahri (Iin), a colleague in my office at the DPR, for her time and efforts.

My special thanks also go to the many persons who allocated so much of their time for references, information and interviews with me. Of course, it is not only the time and effort they took for which I am grateful; it is above all, their willingness to share their knowledge and views. Perhaps, the most memorable discussions were with my father who, unfortunately, passed away three years before I finally submitted this dissertation. For this reason, I also dedicate this book to the memory of my father, Sahat M. Nainggolan, SH., who rests in peace in the national cemetery.

Last, but by no means least, my heart goes to my family in Jakarta, Indonesia, particularly to my wife, Riris Katharina, who has for many months looked after our lovely daughter, Reynalda Alesha, and took care of family concerns while I was conducting fieldwork in Indonesia and wrote my dissertation in Germany. She has given me the support, encouragement, and love, without which this PhD dissertation could not have been accomplished.

Due to acoustics neuroma illness, I nearly collapsed during the writing of these acknowledgement in my apartement in Freiburg. Thank God, I could return home and meet my family before being sent to the hospital for an immediate medical check-up. Amazingly, I see another miracle in my life, after a 14 hours complicated surgery, I have survived to finish these acknowledgements.

Needless to say, *endlich*, none of the persons mentioned above is to be blamed for the shortcomings of this dissertation, for which I am alone responsible.

Jakarta, April 2011
Poltak Partogi Nainggolan

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A A K	Aliansi Anti-Komunis (<i>Anti-Communist Alliance</i>)
A B R I	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (<i>Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia</i>)
Akmil	Akademi Militer (<i>Military Academy</i>)
A M I N	Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (<i>The Indonesian Mujahidin Force</i>)
A M P I	Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia (<i>Pro-Golkar youth organization for Indonesia's reform</i>)
A P B N	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (<i>National Revenue and Expenditure Budget</i>)
Aster	Asisten Teritorial (<i>Territorial Assistant</i>)
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa (<i>lowest military post at village level</i>)
B A I S	Badan Intelijen Strategis (<i>Military Strategic Intelligence Board</i>)
Bakorstanas	Badan Kordinasi Pemeliharaan Stabilitas Nasional (<i>Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability</i>)
Bakin	Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (<i>National Intelligence Coordinating Board</i>)
Banpres	Bantuan Presiden (<i>presidential aid funds</i>)
Banser	Barisan Serbaguna (<i>The Versatile Guard</i>)
B I N	Badan Intelijen Nasional (<i>National Intelligence Board</i>)
B L B I	Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (<i>liquidity credits from the Bank Indonesia</i>)
B M P	Besi Merah Putih (<i>Red-White Iron militia group</i>)
B P P C	Badan Pengelolaan dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (<i>Clove Marketing and Buffer Agency</i>)
Brig. Gen.	<i>Brigadier General</i>
Brimob	Brigade Mobile (<i>heavily armed special police unit</i>)
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik (<i>State Logistics Agency</i>)

CAVR	<i>Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste (The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor)</i>
COHA	<i>Cessation of Hostilities Agreement</i>
CIDES	<i>Center for Information and Development Studies</i>
CPM	<i>Corps Polisi Militer (Military Police Corps)</i>
CSIS	<i>Centre Strategic for International Studies</i>
CTF	<i>Commission for Truth and Friendship</i>
DDII	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council)</i>
Dephan	<i>Departemen Pertahanan (Department of Defence)</i>
Dephankam	<i>Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan (Department of Defense and Security)</i>
DI/TII	<i>Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Soldier/ Indonesian Islamic Soldier)</i>
DKM	<i>Dewan Kehormatan Militer (Military Honorary Council)</i>
DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer (military operations zone)</i>
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)</i>
DPR D-I	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I (House of Representatives at provincial level)</i>
DPRD-II	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II (House of Representatives at municipality/regency level)</i>
DPR P	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (The Provincial House of Representative of the Papuan People)</i>
Falintil	<i>Forças Armadas para a Liberação Nacional do Timor Leste (the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)</i>
Foreri Jaya	<i>Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya)</i>
FPDU	<i>Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah (Sovereignty of the Islamic Community Parties Faction)</i>
FPI	<i>Front Pembela Islam (Front for Islam Defenders)</i>
Fretilin	<i>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)</i>
FSPUI	<i>Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam (Muslim Forum for Communication and Struggle)</i>
FUI	<i>Forum Ummat Islam (Forum for Muslims)</i>
FURKON	<i>Forum untuk Perjuangan Keadilan dan Konstitusi (Forum for the Promotion of Justice and Constitution)</i>

G A M	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (<i>Movement for An Independent Aceh</i>)
G D P	<i>Gross Domestic Product</i>
Gen.	<i>General</i>
G N P	<i>Gross National Product</i>
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
G P K	Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (<i>Kabah Youth Movement</i>)
G P K	Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (<i>Security Disturbance Movement</i>)
G-30-S/PKI	Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (<i>The September 30, 1965 Rebellion Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party</i>)
HAMMAS	Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus (<i>Inter-University Muslim Students Association</i>)
Hankamrata	Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (<i>total defense based on the people power</i>)
H D C	<i>Henry Dunant Center</i>
I C G	<i>International Crisis Group</i>
I C M I	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (<i>Association of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals</i>)
I C W	<i>Indonesian Corruption Watch</i>
Inpres	Instruksi Presiden (<i>Presidential Instruction</i>)
I P T N	Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional (<i>national aircraft industry</i>)
I T B	Institut Teknologi Bandung (<i>Bandung Institute of Technology</i>)
J I	Jamaah Islamiyah (<i>Islamic Community</i>)
KAMMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Muslim Student Actions Association</i>)
Kapolri	Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (<i>Chief of the National Police</i>)
Kasgab	Kepala Staf Gabungan (<i>Chief of the Joint Staffs</i>)
Kasospol	Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (<i>Chief of Social-Politics Affairs</i>)
Kaster	Kepala Staf Teritorial (<i>TNI Chief of Territorial Affairs</i>)
Kasum	Kepala Staf Umum (<i>TNI Chief for General Affairs</i>)
Keppres	Keputusan Presiden (<i>Presidential Decree</i>)
KISDI	Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam (<i>Solidarity Committee for Islamic World</i>)
K K N	Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (<i>Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism</i>)

K K R	Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (<i>Committee for Truth and Reconciliation</i>)
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer (<i>Military Regional Command</i>)
Kodim	Komando Distrik Militer (<i>Military District Command</i>)
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (<i>National Commission for Human Rights</i>)
Kontras	Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (<i>The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence</i>)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (<i>Army's Special Forces</i>)
Kopkamtib	Komando Operasional untuk Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (<i>The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order</i>)
Koramil	Komando Rayon Militer (<i>Military Sub-District Command</i>)
Kostrad	Komando Cadangan Strategis (<i>Army's Strategic Reserve Command</i>)
KPP HAM Tintim	Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (<i>Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East Timor</i>)
K P U	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (<i>National Elections Commission</i>)
K S A D	Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (<i>Army Chief</i>)
Laksus	Pelaksana Khusus (<i>Special Agency</i>)
Lemhannas	Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (<i>National Resilience Council</i>)
L B H	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (<i>Legal Aid Foundation</i>)
L I P I	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Institute of Sciences</i>)
L J	Laskar Jihad (<i>Jihad Warriors</i>)
Lt. Gen.	<i>Lieutenant General</i>
Mahidi	Mati Hidup untuk Indonesia (<i>alive or dead for the sake of Indonesia</i>)
Malari	Malapetaka 15 Januari 1974 (<i>The January 15, 1974 Incident</i>)
Maj. Gen.	<i>Major General</i>
M B B	<i>Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm</i>
Mendagri	Menteri Dalam Negeri (<i>Minister of Domestic Affairs</i>)
Menhan	Menteri Pertahanan (<i>Minister of Defense</i>)
Menhankam	Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan (<i>Minister of Defense and Security</i>)
Menkopolkam	Menteri Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan (<i>Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security</i>)

Menpen	Menteri Penerangan (<i>Minister of Information</i>)
M I L F	<i>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</i>
M N L F	<i>Moro National Liberation Front</i>
M P R	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (<i>People's Consultative Assembly</i>)
M R P	Majelis Rakyat Papua (<i>The Papuan People's Assembly</i>)
M U I	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (<i>Council of Islamic Clerics</i>)
N G O	<i>Non-Government Organization</i>
N K R I	Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (<i>Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia</i>)
N I I	Negara Islam Indonesia (<i>The Indonesian Islamic State</i>)
N U	Nadhlatul Ulama (<i>the resurrected Islamic cleric group</i>)
O P M	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (<i>Organization for an Independent Papua</i>)
Opsus	Operasi Khusus (<i>Special Operation</i>)
O T K	Orang Tak Dikenal (<i>unknown perpetrators</i>)
Pam Swakarsa	Pasukan Pengaman Swakarsa (<i>voluntary civilian security forces</i>)
Pangdam	Panglima Komando Daerah Militer (<i>Military Regional Commander</i>)
Pangkostrad	Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (<i>Army's Strategic Reserve Commander</i>)
Pansus	Panitia Khusus (<i>Special Committee</i>)
Paspampres	Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden (<i>military elite presidential security guards</i>)
P B B	Partai Bulan Bintang (<i>Crescent Star Party</i>)
P B H I	Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (<i>The Indonesian Association for Legal Assistances</i>)
P D I	<i>Indonesian Democratic Party</i>
P D I P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (<i>Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle</i>)
P D K B	Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (<i>Love the Nation Democratic Party</i>)
P D P	Presidium Dewan Papua (<i>Presidium of the Papuan Assembly</i>)
Pepera	Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (<i>the UN Act of Free Choice</i>)
Perda	Peraturan Daerah (<i>Regional Government Regulation</i>)
Permesta	Piagam Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (<i>Charter for People's Struggle</i>)
Perpu	<i>Government Regulation in lieu of a Law</i>

Petrus	Penembak Misterius (<i>Mysterious Shooter</i>)
Pilkada	Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (<i>direct elections of governors, mayors, or head of districts</i>)
P K	Partai Keadilan (<i>Justice Party</i>)
P K B	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (<i>National Awakening Party</i>)
P K I	Partai Komunis Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Communist Party</i>)
P okja	Kelompok Kerja (<i>Working Committe</i>)
Polres	Polisi Resort (<i>Resort Police</i>)
PP	Pemuda Pancasila (<i>Pancasila Youth</i>)
P P M I	Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (<i>The Association of Indonesian Muslim Workers</i>)
P P I	Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (<i>all East Timorese pro-integration militias</i>)
P P P	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (<i>United Development Party</i>)
P P R C	Pasukan Pengendali Reaksi Cepat (<i>new rapid strike forces</i>)
PPRM	Pasukan Pencegah Rusuh Massa (<i>operational troops for preventing mass revolt</i>)
P R R I	Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (<i>Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia</i>)
R M S	Republik Maluku Selatan (<i>The Republic of South Maluku</i>)
R U U	Rancangan Undang-undang (<i>Bill</i>)
RUU KKN	Rancangan Undang-undang Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara (<i>Bill on State Safety and Security</i>)
Satgas P3TT	Satuan Tugas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur (<i>task force for popular consultation on the East Timor referendum</i>)
S B S I	Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Workers Union</i>)
S B Y	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (<i>The Sixth Indonesian President</i>)
Sesko	Sekolah Komando (<i>Military Command School</i>)
S G I	Satuan Gugus Tugas Intelijen (<i>Military Intelligence Task Force</i>)
S I R A	Sentra Informasi untuk Reformasi Aceh (<i>Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum</i>)
SIUPP	Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press (<i>press enterprise permit letter</i>)
Sishankamrata	Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (<i>total people's defense and security system</i>)
S P 3	Surat Penghentian Penyelidikan dan Penuntutan (<i>Letter for Cancellation of the Investigation and Prosecution</i>)

SPKP HAM	Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM (<i>Brotherhood Solidarity for the Victims of Human Rights Violations</i>)
TAP MPR	Ketetapan MPR (<i>MPR decree</i>)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (<i>Indonesian Military</i>)
TPF	Tim Pencari Fakta (<i>Fact Finding Team</i>)
UI	Universitas Indonesia (<i>University of Indonesia</i>)
UNHCR	<i>United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees</i>
UU	Undang-undang (<i>Law/Act</i>)
UNTAET	<i>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</i>
UNTEA	<i>United Nations for Temporary Administration</i>
Wakasad	Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (<i>Army Deputy Chief</i>)

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